River and 200-300 years at the Erlln gauge, Mulde River [IKSE, 2004] . Two flood types could be distinguished in Saxony: flash floods affecting smaller catchment areas in the Ore Mountains (Erzgebirge), particularly those of the Weißeritz, Mulde and Zschopau rivers, and a slowly rising riverine flood along the Elbe River and at the confluences with its tributaries
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[ Ulbrich et al., 2003] . Floods of short duration with a relatively high peak discharge [UNESCO, 2006] , in this case caused by very intense rainfall, were defined as "flash floods" in this study. For instance, the village of Weesenstein on the banks of the Müglitz River was particularly affected by a flash flood. The water level rose by 1 m between 9:30 and 10:30 a.m. local time on 12 th of August 2002, and continued to rise at a rate of 0.5 mh -1 until the (Landeshochwasserzentrum LHWZ, www.hochwasserzentrum.sachsen.de) and the water levels measured at the gauges are automatically collected and transferred to that center. If 110 specific water levels are exceeded, an urgent warning is automatically generated which the communities have to acknowledge. Other initiatives have aimed at the introduction or expansion of flood risk mapping schemes in several affected federal states. For example, the Swiss flood hazard mapping scheme [BUWAL, 1998 ] was introduced by the state of Saxony.
Further information on flood mapping and early warning systems in Germany after the
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August 2002 flood has been published by DKKV [2003] and Thieken et al. [2005b] .
Germany is one of the few European countries in which private insurance companies offer natural hazards insurance [Vetters and Prettenthaler, 2003] . For companies, commercial property insurance and all-risk policies are available. Additionally, insurance coverage is 120 available for interruption to business, covering fixed expenses as well as lost profit [Jakli, 2003] . However, particularly hazard-prone locations are often excluded from flood insurance or are only insured if high premiums are paid. For small companies with an insured inventory of less than 2.5 million €, risk classification is undertaken via the zoning system for inundation (ZÜRS) specifically developed for insurance issues [Kriebisch, 2000; Kleeberg, 125 2001] as well as via information about flood damage during the last ten years and the distance to the river. For large companies with high premiums, individual examinations are carried out.
After the 2002 flood, conditions of existing insurance contracts were barely altered. However, one third of the insurance companies have announced an increase in insurance premiums and/or deductibles when new contracts are signed [Thieken et al., 2006] . More than 50% of 130 the insurance companies indicated that they would improve their risk assessment, leading to tightened conditions. Although the insurance industry had generally given up its negative attitude towards a compulsory flood insurance after the 2002 flood [Schwarze and Wagner, 2004] , no agreement between the insurance industry and the German federal states could be achieved.
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In Germany, the traditional approach to flood protection was generally characterized by a safety mentality. Protection was aimed at design criteria (for instance, the 100-year flood), without a detailed analysis and debate about the complete spectrum of possible events, failure scenarios and protection objectives. This traditional safety mentality or promise of protection 140 is slowly being replaced by a risk culture. Such a risk culture is based on a comprehensive analysis of the flood risk and an appraisal of potential risk-reducing measures. Further, it takes into account the fact that flood defense systems may fail and it makes preparations for such unexpected crisis situations. A key element is an open dialogue about risk and riskreducing options, involving all stakeholders [DKKV, 2003] . For an efficient, integrated 145 approach, not only public efforts like technical protection measures and an increase in natural retention have to be taken into account. The mitigation potential of companies via flood precautionary measures and response to early warning also has to be investigated and is being increasingly encouraged [Hayes, 2004; Wynn, 2004] . The previously prevalent separate view of the two main elements of flood risk management, precautionary measures and response, 150 has to be overcome. All aspects of flood risk reduction and disaster response have been integrated into the cycle of disaster management. This means, for instance, that reconstruction after the disaster already has to contain the foundations for improved precautionary measures.
Therefore, disaster management should be analyzed following the disaster cycle, which describes the consecutive phases that a society undergoes after it has been struck by a disaster.
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The concept of the disaster cycle has been widely used and various versions have been
published [e.g., Silver, 2001; DKKV, 2003; FEMA, 2004] . Adapted to companies, the phases, preparedness, response, recovery and disaster risk reduction may be described as follows: if companies had already been affected by a flood or were aware of the flood risk, they might companies were willing to learn from the disaster and invest in disaster risk reduction, precautionary measures could often be implemented without large additional effort when extensive reconstruction needs to be undertaken anyhow.
To improve the flood management of companies, a comprehensive analysis of the 175 precautionary measures taken in advance and the ability to cope with the actual flood should be undertaken in the aftermath of an event. However, only limited data about companies' flood risk and their management are available. This lack of information was already described
by Ramirez et al. in 1988 , but the situation has not changed much since then. Research about flood damage has concentrated almost exclusively on residential flood damage [Gissing and 180 Blong, 2004] . Only a few studies deal quantitatively with the measures companies can undertake to reduce their flood losses [Smith, 1981; ICPR, 2002; Kreibich et al., 2005a] .
Additionally, representative results are difficult to obtain due to the diverse spectrum of companies [Gissing and Blong, 2004] . An approach to reducing this high data variability is the classification of companies into subgroups according to economic sectors [Smith, 1981; 185 Parker et al., 1987; Merz et al., 2004] .
In order to gain more knowledge about precautionary measures taken by companies and their abilities to cope with the adverse effects of floods, a survey was undertaken among companies in Saxony affected by the August 2002 flood. Specifically, the aim of this study is the 190 identification of improvement potential in the flood management of companies. The companies were divided into sectors to reduce data variability within the subgroups and to identify differences between sectors. Hence, the sectors with the largest improvement potential will be identified and recommended for specific measures and programs.
195
2 Material and Method
Survey
On the basis of information obtained from the affected communities and districts, lists of affected streets in Saxony ( Fig. 1 ) were comprised and with the help of the telephone directory (yellow pages) a site-specific random sample of 1500 companies was generated.
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Since the manufacturing sector was strongly underrepresented, 342 additional addresses of manufacturing companies were randomly selected in the same manner and added to the given area of the premises, the interviewer was informed about this contradiction and prompted to clarify the situation. The person who had the best knowledge about flood damage to the company was always questioned. In 70% of the cases this was a member of the management board.
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The answers keyed in during the interviews were automatically saved in SPSS data format.
As far as possible, further plausibility checks were made after the interviews. Since a significant proportion of the resulting data is not normally distributed, the mean and the median are given. Statistical analysis was undertaken with the software SPSS for Windows, Version 11.5.1. Significant differences between two independent groups of data (e.g. flood
290
type areas) were tested by the Mann-Whitney-U-Test [Norušis, 2002] . Significant differences between three or more groups of data (e.g. sectors) were tested with the Kruskal-Wallis-HTest [Norušis, 2002] . It tests the null hypothesis that all groups possess the same probability distribution against the alternative hypothesis that the distributions differ, that is, one or more of the distributions are shifted to the right or left of each other. For both tests a significance 295 level of p < 0.05 was used.
Data set
The resulting data set contains 415 completed interviews representing a variety of sectors, company sizes, building owners and leasers ( Most interviewed companies belonged to the commercial sector (39%), the fewest to the agricultural sector (2%) ( Table 1 ). For the sake of completeness, the results of the agricultural 320 sector are shown. However, since only seven agricultural companies are included in the data set, statistical analyses of this sector are problematic and results have to be reviewed critically.
Most interviews were completed for companies with up to 10 employees (62%), only 21% 325 had more than 50 employees (data not shown). The median was 6 and the mean 37 employees (Table 1 ). The manufacturing sector included the largest companies in respect to the number of employees and business volume. In this sector, most companies owned their buildings. In contrast, ownership rate was lowest in the financial sector. Based on the definition of flood types, 63% of the interviewed companies were located in flash flood areas (Table 1) . In most 330 sector-subsets, the percentage of companies in flash flood areas was around 70%. In contrast, in the commercial and financial sectors, only 58% and 51% of the companies were located in flash flood areas, respectively. The companies affected by the 2002 flood along the Elbe River and its tributaries had little flood experience. Only 25% had experienced at least one flood before, and only 13% of the others knew that they were located in a flood prone area (Table 1) . Furthermore, as the last experience with a flood was on average 39 years before, memories of the flood had faded.
Results and Discussion
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The floods most often mentioned, when asked about the last experienced flood event, were the floods in (Table 1 ). In the manufacturing sector it was highest with 34% flood experienced companies.
In the financial and service sector it was lowest with only 14% and 13% experienced companies, respectively.
Before the August 2002 flood event, 49% of all interviewed companies had undertaken at 350 least one precautionary measure (Fig. A1 ). Significant differences between the sectors existed, with highest preparedness in the manufacturing and agricultural sectors and lowest preparedness in the financial sector. This can be explained on the one hand by flood experience and knowledge, and on the other hand by the sizes of the companies and building ownership [Brenniman, 1994; Kreibich et al., 2005a; Grothmann and Reusswig, 2006] . The 355 awareness of being located in a flood prone area was most prevalent and flood experience highest in the manufacturing sector (Table 1) . None of the interviewed inexperienced companies in the agricultural sector had known that they were located in a flood prone area, but the percentage of experienced companies was, with 29%, second highest of all sectors. In the financial sector, the awareness of being located in a flood prone area was lowest and flood 360 experience second lowest of all sectors. Kreibich et al. [2005a] found that companies which own their building(s) and larger companies (many employees, high business volume) tend to undertake precautionary measures more often than others. Therefore, it is not surprising that the manufacturing sector, which contains the largest companies on average and the second highest percentage of building owners, shows a comparatively high level of preparedness. In contrast, in the financial sector with the lowest level of preparedness, ownership rate was lowest and the average company size was small to medium.
Of all precautionary measures, those related to the building were the most prevalent whilst behavioral measures (i.e. emergency exercises, emergency plans) were the least (Fig. A1 ). building precautionary measures applicable to the specific company. For most sectors, the most prevalent building precautionary measure was "flood proofing of air conditioning/exhaust-air vents", second was "flood proofing of tanks, silos and other storage containers" (data not shown). This may be due to high standards when buying and installing air conditioning systems or exhaust-air vents and to laws and regulations like the statutory 385 order on hazardous incidents. The least popular measure was "flood-adapting the building structure", i.e. using an especially stable building foundation, waterproof seal the cellar, etc.
This may be due to the fact that it requires a large initial investment and does not necessarily provide protection against extreme flood events [MURL, 2000] . Detailed investigations of the mitigating effects of the different building precautionary measures revealed that most 390 measures had led to a reduction in mean building damage and all measures had led to a reduction in median building damage to companies. But differences were not significant, most likely due to the heterogeneity of the companies and the small sample size [Kreibich et al., 2005a] .
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The lack of popularity of behavioral precautionary measures, which do not seem to be expensive in comparison to some building precautionary measures, may be due to the fact that a certain level of ongoing effort and continued investment is necessary. Emergency plans have to be updated and exercises have to be undertaken regularly. This is in contrast to building precautionary measures, e.g. when flood proof air conditioning is installed, no more 400 additional effort is needed. Additionally, the improvements of the buildings are clearly visible, whereas the improvements in preparation are difficult to judge. For most sectors, emergency plans were available more than twice as often as emergency exercises had been undertaken (data not shown). In total, 42 companies (10%) had had emergency plans available, 18 companies (4%) had undertaken emergency exercises before August 2002. It can 405 be speculated that the popularity of plans in contrast to exercises might be due to the necessity of business interruptions during the time when exercises are undertaken. However, the two measures should not be viewed separately, since emergency plans that have not been tested during emergency exercises may be ineffective. Most importantly, it should be noted that expenditures for flood preparedness and exercises amount to only a fraction of a percent of 410 the commonly very high damage potential of large businesses [ICPR, 2002] .
Response to the August 2002 flood
The flood warnings had reached the companies on average 20 hours (median 8 hours) before their premises were flooded (Table 2) . However, 45% of the interviewed companies had not 415 been warned at all. 32% had recognized the flood danger through their own observations, 11% had been warned by employees, friends or other companies and 14% by nationwide news programs. Flood warnings disseminated by the authorities had reached only 25% of all surveyed companies. Official warnings had been spread mainly by loudspeakers, flyers, etc., followed by local radio stations. 7% of the companies had been specifically warned by a 420 direct message from the authorities to their company (data not shown).
Comparing the situation in the flash flood areas with the riverine flood areas, significant differences were only apparent relating to the lead time of the warnings, not concerning the means of warning (except for nationwide news). In the flash flood areas, companies had been 425 warned on average only 10 hours before the flood reached them, in the riverine flood areas it was 34 hours before ( Mountains (flash flood area) only a few hours before houses were flooded, whilst along the Elbe River (riverine flood area) a lead time of several days had been possible. The percentage of companies that had not been warned at all was similar in both areas, as well as the percentage of companies that had been warned by the authorities (Table 2 ). This is in contrast to findings in the residential sector, where only about 12% of the households along the Elbe
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River and almost 40% along the Elbe tributaries had not been warned at all (Thieken et al., 2006b ). In terms of warning time and means of warning, there are no significant differences between the sectors (data not shown).
The percentage of companies that had undertaken emergency measures (67%) is even larger 440 than the percentage that stated that they had been warned, which implies that some companies had become aware of the danger of flooding and had acted without receiving a warning. The main aim of emergency measures is the safeguarding of equipment, goods, products or stock, which might be achieved by moving them to flood save areas or by using water barriers to prevent the water from entering the building. The percentage of companies that undertook 445 emergency measures and the resulting costs were not significantly different between the sectors, in contrast to the number of people involved and the time spent (Table 1 ). In the manufacturing sector, the greatest number of people was involved and a long time was spent on emergency measures, which correlates with the highest number of employees in this sector. In the service sector the fewest people were involved and in the financial sector the 450 shortest time was spent on emergency measures. These differences might also be due to the "nature" of the business, e.g. it is much more time-consuming to dismantle and relocate large machinery and numerous goods, products or stock in a manufacturing company, than computers and ring binders which might be the predominant inventory in the service and financial sectors.
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Whether emergency measures can reduce flood damage depends on their effectiveness.
Companies that had undertaken emergency measures were asked whether they were able to save their equipment or their goods, products or stock completely, largely, to a limited extent or not at all. Only 7% of the companies that had undertaken emergency measures were able to 460 save their equipment completely, and 10% were able to save their goods, products or stock completely (Fig. A2 ). Large parts of equipment and goods etc. could be saved by 21% and 18%, respectively. Despite the efforts undertaken, 28% of the companies were not able to save any equipment and 34% were not able to save any goods, products or stock. Differences between the sectors concerning the effectiveness of emergency measures undertaken were 465 only significant concerning goods, products or stock. Measuring the saving of large and complete parts of goods, products or stock as success, the manufacturing and commercial sectors contain the largest percentage of successful companies. The service sector contains the largest percentage of companies that were able to save their goods, products and stock completely, but it also contains the largest percentage of companies that were not able to save 470 anything.
The comparison of damage to goods, products or stock of companies that had undertaken their respective emergency measures successfully with the other companies reveals a significant damage mitigation of 52%, on average (Fig. 2) . Successfully saving the equipment 
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To investigate in more detail, the factors that may support the effectiveness of emergency measures undertaken, the companies were split into two subgroups, the ones that had undertaken emergency measures effectively and the remaining companies. Companies were included in the first group when they were able to save their equipment or their goods, products and stock completely, and also when they were able to save their equipment and 485 goods, products and stock largely. Only relatively recent flood experience seems to support effective emergency measures (Table 3) . General flood experience and knowledge about the flood hazard were not significantly different between the two groups. This is in accordance with the findings of Burn [1999] and Yeo [2002] , that prior experience with flood events is most useful when it was received recently. As expected, if an emergency plan was available, 490 measures could be undertaken more effectively (Table 3) . But surprisingly, the emergency exercises undertaken did not differ significantly between the two groups. Warnings, particularly those from authorities, were favorable factors, as well as relatively long lead times (Table 3) . For instance, the companies that were able to save their equipment or goods, products or stock completely, had had average lead times of at least 15 hours (Fig. 3) . In contrast, the companies that were not able to save anything at all had had average lead times of less than 10 hours. Additionally, building owners and large companies seemed to be more efficient with their emergency measures (Table 3) . However, flood damage is not only influenced by the vulnerability, but also by the flood hazard, specifically by the intensity [Mileti, 1999; Merz and Thieken, 2004] . Therefore, companies that had been affected by high 500 water levels had more problems undertaking effective emergency measures than those exposed to lower flood water levels (Table 3) .
Nonetheless, 32% of all interviewed companies had not undertaken any emergency measures (Table 1) . The main reason, stated by 87% of these companies, was that it was too late to do anything. This corresponds to the 74% of all interviewed companies that stated that they could have undertaken (more) emergency measures, if the warning had reached them earlier.
A study in the residential sector revealed the same result, i.e. the main reason why people did not perform emergency measures was lack of time, and many affirmed that they could have done more if they had been warned earlier (Thieken et al., submitted, 2006) . This underscores 510 the fact that early warning is an important precondition for the effective performance of emergency measures. The second most often stated reason, why no emergency measures had been undertaken, was that it was not possible to reach the premises of the company since the access road had been interrupted. Possibly it might have been too late as well, but this can not be judged from the companies' answers. Anyhow, a great amount of damage to infrastructure 515 had occurred. More than 750 km of rural, county and state roads as well as 585 bridges were damaged in Saxony alone [IKSE, 2004] . Still, 8% of the companies had underestimated the flood hazard. These problems seem to have been similar for all sectors, since no significant differences are apparent. 
Flood losses and recovery
The flood in August 2002 was the most severe flood ever experienced for 71% of the interviewed companies that had experienced a flood before. The mean total damage amounted to 1.1 million € (median 0.2 million €) (Fig. 4) . Mean values are consistently higher than the median values, i.e. damage data show a strongly skewed distribution. Means are dominated 525 by a few companies with very high damage; only 16% of the 179 companies for which total damage could be calculated experienced total damage of 1.0 million € or above. The highest total damage in our survey amounted to 31.0 million €, the second highest to 21.5 million €, followed by three companies with more than 10.0 million €.
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Losses differ significantly between the sectors, with the highest total damage in the manufacturing sector and the lowest in the agricultural sector (Fig. 4) . This is in accordance with the findings of Merz et al. [2004] , who reported highest total damage to the infrastructure and in the manufacturing sector and lowest total damage in the agricultural sector. This difference is mainly due to the different amounts of assets accumulated in the 535 sectors. The manufacturing sector, with the highest total damage, is also the sector with the highest business volume (Table 1 ). The relative damage to building(s), equipment and goods, products or stock, which is independent from the absolute assets affected and is therefore better able to show the effects of preparedness, precautionary measures, etc., reveals a different ranking of sectors (Table 1) . For most sectors, damage to building(s) represents on 540 average the highest percentage damage and damage to vehicles the lowest (Fig. 4) . Still, there are significant differences between sectors, e.g. in the manufacturing sector, the building damage represents 32% of the total damage in contrast to the service sector where it represents 63%. This is in contrast to results based on German flood damage data using the following damage categories: damage to buildings, movable inventory and fixed inventory 545 [Merz et al., 2004] , where total damage in the manufacturing and service sectors were dominated by damage to movable inventory. Damage to equipment is also very important in the manufacturing sector, whereas for the commercial, financial and service sectors the damage due to business interruption is the second most important damage type (Fig. 4) .
Unfortunately, due to a lack of responses, calculating the damage ratio, i.e. the relative 550 damage (damage divided by the current market value), was only possible for a few companies and the three damage types: building(s), equipment and goods, products or stock (Table 1) .
The accuracy of the responses relating to current market values could not be verified, nevertheless Table 1 gives an idea of the damage ratios, which are significantly different between the sectors for equipment and goods, products or stock. The agricultural and 555 manufacturing sectors have the lowest mean damage ratios. The financial sector has the highest mean damage ratio for equipment and the service sector the highest mean damage ratio for goods, products or stock.
Duration of flooding, business interruptions and business limitations significantly differ
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between sectors (Table 1) . Interruption to business means that no business activities, such as production or service, are possible. Reasons for business interruptions are, for instance, lifeline disruptions such as lack of electricity, water or communication links; destruction of key machinery for the production process; or a lack of raw material due to transport disruptions or problems at the ancillary industries. Business limitation means that the business 565 is operating, but not at a normal level due to ongoing restrictions such as unusable building areas, storage areas or machinery which leads to lower productivity or business volume. The average duration of interruption to business is lowest in the service and agricultural sectors, but the mean duration of business limitation is longest in both of these sectors. In the manufacturing sector, mean duration of business limitation is lowest. The mean duration of 570 business interruption is longest in the commercial sector. For all companies, the average duration of flooding was 4.7 days, the mean duration of interruption to business was 43.1 days and the average duration of business limitations was 92.1 days (Table 1) . Correlations between these three duration times are weak, but the maximum water level at the premises had a strong impact on the duration of business interruption and business limitation. An (Table 1) . Not only absolute compensation was significantly different between sectors (which was expected due to the significantly different amounts of total damage), but also the percentage of damages that was 590 compensated. Both average total damage and average damage compensation were highest in the manufacturing sector, the percentage damage compensated was, with 45%, only medium (Table 1 ). The financial sector received, on average, the second lowest damage compensation and had the lowest percentage damage compensated. The highest percentage damage compensated was in the commercial and agricultural sectors.
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To gain more information about the state of recovery, companies were asked to compare the state of their company before the flood and at the time of the interview, and to evaluate the difference on a scale from 1 (= meanwhile, damage is completely eliminated) to 6 (= there is still considerable damage). At the time of interview, i.e. about 14 and 21 months after the 600 flood, 65% of the companies evaluated their recovery status with a "1" or "2", i.e. had already recovered well (Fig. A3) (Fig. A3) . 
Lessons learned and disaster risk reduction
The flood motivated a relatively large number of companies to undertake private precautionary measures (Fig. A4) . As was the case before the flood, building precautionary measures were most popular: 39% of the companies had undertaken building precautionary 615 measures after the flood and an additional 6% were planning to undertake such measures within the next six months, at the time of the interview. The service sector had best improved its building precautionary measures, so that it is now on a comparatively high level together with the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. Also, quite a few companies in the financial sector undertook building precautionary measures, but this sector still remains the one with 
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In nearly all phases of flood management there are significant differences between the sectors.
This justifies the classification of companies into sectors, at least for the analysis of flood losses. The manufacturing sector has the comparatively best preparedness and precaution status, but also the highest damage potential. The mean damage ratios for equipment and goods, products or stock are relatively low in this sector. But due to the high assets and 675 business volumes, the total damage is highest in the manufacturing sector. Thus, specific
incentive programs for this sector should mainly aim at a reduction of exposed assets and prevent the establishment and expansion of manufacturing companies in flood prone areas.
The financial sector has the highest mean damage ratio for equipment and the service sector the highest mean damage ratio for goods, products or stock. Preparedness and precaution are 680 comparatively weak in these sectors. Therefore, specific incentive and communication programs should be developed to motivate financial and service companies to undertake behavioral and building precautionary measures.
The significant differences between the sectors suggest that this classification may also be 685 suitable for the estimation of flood losses. Additionally, damage models should take more factors besides the water level into consideration, e.g. the damage reducing effects of emergency and precautionary measures. However, the benefits of these measures are strongly dependent on their effectiveness which can barely be assessed ex-ante. Therefore, more research is needed to integrate these findings into improved flood damage models. 
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